Localizing Identity: The Only Way Out of the Syrian Human Earthquake
In Syria, as in most parts of the world, two mindsets collide: an open mindset that accepts the “Other,” and a closed one that rejects them. From my perspective, I do not see this divide as a byproduct of educational levels or academic degrees, nor is it rooted solely in religious or secular convictions. Rather, it is a general social phenomenon. You find it within a single household and among siblings—one may be open-minded while the other is insular. This is perhaps the case in homes worldwide, but when we look at Syria, we notice three key factors that make this issue more complex, more profound, and more visible than elsewhere:
1. State Instability and the Confusion of Managing Diversity
Syria suffers from a lack of stability in the state’s form, system, and identity. Since its independence, the country has oscillated between civilian and military rule, parliamentary and presidential systems, and eventually, totalitarianism and fascism. This turbulence has turned “Syrian Identity” into a battlefield rather than a unifying umbrella.
In stable countries, identity remains clear even at the height of conflict. Spain, for instance, found stability through the “Autonomous Communities” system for Catalonia, allowing for a distinct language, culture, and even sports teams despite secessionist movements. Britain ended decades of bloodshed in Northern Ireland through the “Good Friday Agreement,” which adopted power-sharing instead of attempting to erase the opposition (such as the IRA), but rather integrating them politically.
In Syria, however, identity is forged by the gun. It appears Islamic one day and leftist or nationalist the next, depending on the military force in control. It is as if the military dictates the history of the land, not the politicians. The Syrian individual still refuses the “death of the past,” living in an obsession with reclaiming it, or seeking to transplant the past of another nation onto Syria’s future. This confusion triggers a “human earthquake” and catastrophes every decade (the 1980s, 2004, the Arab Spring, and our current reality).
2. Dogmatic Decision-Making and Existential Conflict
Instability breeds a state of blind dogmatism, where each party believes they possess the absolute truth. If we compare this to Egypt—which was the primary source of ideological exports (such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Nasserism) to Syria—we find a fundamental difference in the “culture of coexistence.”
In Egypt, conflicting currents managed to form a single social fabric. A prime example is the marriage of the Marxist-leftist poet Ahmed Fouad Negm to the artist Azza Balba, who was a staunch Nasserist. This duo represents a model of balance and coexistence; Egyptian Nasserists and Socialists collaborated and engaged in dialogue despite their sharp ideological rifts. In Syria, the scene is entirely different. Divergence has been historically coupled with physical liquidation and political eradication since the era of the UAR (United Arab Republic). This has created exclusionary mindsets that fear the “Other” and seek their erasure—much like the criminalization of the Brotherhood under Hafez al-Assad, or the current mindsets calling for the elimination of specific sects.
3. Dependency on the “Other” and the “Game of Nations”
The third issue is the absence of a pure national project and the total reliance on trans-continental powers. Syria—as described by American author Miles Copeland in his famous book The Game of Nations—was not merely a state with independent decision-making, but a theater for coups that reflected regional and international balances (such as the Saudi-Iraqi rivalry or the British-French-American competition).
This external dependency has created “trans-border mindsets” that refuse to limit their affiliation to the Syrian interior:
The Arab Nationalist: Sees Syria merely as a province in a nation stretching from the Ocean to the Gulf.
The Islamist: Ties Syria’s fate to a trans-border Islamic Ummah.
The Syrian Social Nationalist: Envisions a geopolitical entity extending from Kuwait to Cyprus.
Regional Currents: Those tied to neighboring ethnicities or states, deriving their power from abroad.
This fragmentation leaves the Syrian individual “dependent on the Other” for self-definition. Instead of belonging to the Syrian land being the core, belonging to a trans-continental ideology becomes the driver, turning any international tremor into an immediate domestic national disaster.
Conclusion: Toward Localizing Identity and Decision-Making
Attempting to understand Syria today is the first step toward a better Syria. Stability will only be achieved if we transition from the mindset of “eradicating the dissenter” to the mindset of “managing diversity.” The only way out is the “Localization of Syrian Identity.” This requires moving from a mindset of dependency to one of national independence, where belonging to the Syrian land is the primary reference. We need a social contract that ends the military’s role in defining identity and grants Syrians the confidence to forge a future that does not dwell on the past, but builds a state that respects the human being, regardless of their affiliation.